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The paper presents an extended version of the standard textbook prob-
lem of consumer choice. As usual, agents have to decide about their desired
quantities of various consumption goods, at the same time taking into ac-
count their limited budget. Prices for the goods are not ﬁxed but arise from
a Walrasian interaction of total demand and a stylized supply function for
each of the goods. After showing that this type of model cannot be solved
analytically, three different types of evolutionary algorithms are set up to
answer the question whether agents’ behavior according to the rules of these
algorithms can solve the problem of extended consumer choice. There are
two important answers to this question: a) The quality of the results learned
crucially depends on the elasticity of supply, which in turn is shown to be
a measure of the degree of state dependency of the economic problem. b)
Statistical tests suggest that for the agents in the model it is relatively easy
to adhere to the budget constraint, but that it is relatively difﬁcult to reach an
optimum with marginal utility per Dollar being equal for each good.
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11 Introduction
In introductory courses to microeconomics, when it comes to the problem of con-
sumer choice, a question often heard is ‘Do people really behave this way?’ The
standard answer to this question is ‘Not really, but they can learn to achieve the
optimal outcome, anyway’ But, is this really true? Can boundedly rational people
learn how to choose their optimal consumption bundle?
This paper tries to answer this question. In order to do this, the standard text
book problem of consumer choice is extended: The assumption of ﬁxed prices is
dropped, which makes the individual problem even harder to solve. This model
is simulated, applying three different learning techniques in form of three dif-
ferent evolutionary algorithms. These kinds of algorithms have often been ap-
plied to similar economic problems. Interpretations of evolutionary algorithms
as metaphors for various types of learning schemes can be found in e.g. (Dawid,
1999) or (Riechmann, 1999b).
It can be shown, that the learnability of an optimal solution of the extended
consumer choice problem not only depends on the learning technique chosen, but
also on the degree of state dependency of the extended consumer choice problem,
which , in turn, canbe measured by the slope of the supply functions of the model.
Morethan this,it canbe learned,thatiteasiertoadhere tothebudgetconstraint
than it is to ﬁnd the optimal consumption bundle.
Apart from answering a core economic problem, this paper shows some new
features of evolutionary programming, which have rarely been used in economic
modelling before. The most important new feature is the simulation of simulta-
neous constraint optimization over more than just one variable, including binary
coding of the variables and the use of a penalty function.
2 The Economic Model
2.1 The General Structure of the Problem
Let there be a number of n agents (households) facing the standard textbook prob-
lem of consumer choice, i.e. selecting a bundle of consumption goods which,
under the restriction of a limited budget, maximizes utility.
Agents are assumed to have identical utility functions, which do not change
over time t. Utility is derived from consuming a bundle of m different goods










































￿ m are parameters of the model.
The budget M is assumed to be the same for every agent i in every period t, so













￿t represents the market price for good k in t.











































Equation (5) gives the usual non–negativity constraints.
Different from the standard textbook model, prices will not generally be held
ﬁxed, but will be subject to a stylized Walrasian mechanism. For each good k,
in every period t, the price will be determined as the equilibrium price resulting
from the interaction of aggregate demand for good k in t and aggregate supply of
the good.
Aggregate demand forgood k int, Qk
￿t issimply the sumof individualdemand












Aggregate supply will be modelled by a time invariant standard supply func-
















32.2 The Basic Model








Note, that this case does not represent an ‘economic’ problem in the sense of
agents’ ﬁtness being state dependent. Each agent’s utility only depends on her
own actions, but in no way on the actions of any other agent.
For ﬁxed prices the solution to the problem of consumer choice can easily be
derived.

















This result yields two crucial characteristics common to every optimal bundle
of consumption goods. The ﬁrst characteristic is efﬁciency: The whole budget is












The second crucial characteristic of the optimal consumer choice is the fact,













































Both of these well known standard results will become of greater importance
in the second part of the paper.
2.3 The Enhanced Model
In the enhanced case, prices are no longer ﬁxed, i.e. mk
￿
￿ 0 in (7). As a conse-
quence, the problem of consumer choice becomes a problem of state dependent
ﬁtness: Aggregate demand now has an inﬂuence on the market price and the mar-
ket price has an inﬂuence on every single agent’s economic success.
With the introduction of ﬂexible prices the problem becomes analytically un-
solvable. This means that for ﬂexible prices, an explicit numerical solution anal-
ogous to (9) for the ﬁxed price case cannot be found. Nevertheless, at least for
uniformly behaving populations, the characteristics (10) for efﬁciency and (11)
for optimality still apply.
43 The Evolutionary Algorithm
3.1 The Basics
An evolutionary algorithm aiming to model the above setting in an agent based
manner must above all be capableof coping with twoproblems: a) The maximiza-
tion problem in focus involves the optimization of more than just one independent
variable, and b) the maximization problem in focus has to be solved subject to a
constraint.
Both of the problems have been solved in natural sciences before,1 but up to
now there is no economic model making use of these results.
In this paper, a hybrid evolutionary algorithm will be employed, making use
of principles from two worlds, from the world of genetic algorithms (GAs) and
from the world of evolution strategies (ESs). From GAs, the well known oper-
ators of crossover and selection/reproduction are used. In economics, they have
been broadly interpreted as forms of social learning by communication and in-
terpretation as well as the functioning of the market (Riechmann, 1999b). From
evolution strategies, the operator of mutation is used, being interpreted as a form
of isolated individual learning by experiment. Moreover, the variables in focus
will not be coded as bit strings, but as real valued numbers, which is also a feature
of evolution strategies.
To make things clearer, an agent i will be fully described by her economic
plans, i.e. the vector of demanded quantities for each good k in period t, qi
￿k
￿t. In
the simulations, there will only be three different goods available to the agents.
















meaning that agent number 10 plans to consume 11.2 units of the ﬁrst, 3.7 units
of the second and 17 units of the third good in period 5.
3.2 Standard Operators
Due to the change in the representation of the agents, the operators (often called
‘genetic operators’) have to be changed, too. As these operators are used as
1A summary of results can be found in (Michalewicz, 1996).
5metaphors for learning techniques, the changed operators still have to support
a sensible economic interpretation.
The ‘double operator’ of selection and reproduction, often being interpreted
as learning by imitation connected with the role of the market, needs no changes
at all. Agents are selected from their population and reproduced into the next
one with a probability equal to their relative ﬁtness. Fitness, in this case, equals
individual utility. This means, that in this paper, the standard roulette wheel se-
lection operator (Goldberg, 1989) will be used, not one of the selection operators
stemming from the tradition of evolution strategies.
Recombination in the form of crossover is usually seen as a metaphor for
learning by communication. The change of this operator is quite straightforward.
In a real valued rather than a binary representation, agents’ economic strategies
can be separated into clearly deﬁned economic substrategies. A substrategy in the
current model is the consumption quantity of asingle good. This means that in the
above example (13) the agent has three substrategies: 11.2 for good one, 3.7 for
good two, and 17 for good three. Crossover now works as usual, recombinating
two agents’ substrategies. The agents involved in crossover are chosen from their
population, a crossover point is selected, the vectors of substrategies are cut at
the crossover point, the resulting parts are interchanged and put together again,


























































































































































Figure 1: Crossover (example)
In the world of real valued coding of agents’ strategies, the interpretation of
crossover as a form of learning by exchanging substrategies becomes even clearer
than in the world of binary coding.
The third standard operator, mutation, has to be changed, too. Mutation, of-
ten being interpreted as learning by experiment, has to undergo the most severe
changes. Real valued coding certainly does not allow for simple bit ﬂipping. In-
stead, the mutation operator from the tradition of evolution strategies can be used.
In this tradition, asubstrategy qi
￿k
￿t ismutated by adding aterm vk to it, where vk is





























By endogenizing the mutation variance s2, this operator could easily be ex-
tended in order to represent some kind of meta learning (Riechmann, 1998), but
for the clarity of the economic argument this will not be done within this paper.
3.3 Enhanced Operators
In addition to the standard operators, two more ‘enhanced’ operators shall be em-
ployed. The ﬁrst one is the well known election operator (Arifovic, 1994). Elec-
tion requires two (or more) agents to meet, jointly work out new strategies, evalu-
ate these strategies and than ﬁnally decide which strategy to use in reality. Though
election, especially in its basic form, is not undisputed in its economic meaning,3
it is known to result in stablestates of the learning process, which most of the time
even represent optimal solutions to the underlying economic problem.4 Thus —
economically meaningful or not — election represents a good benchmark for the
test of the performance of other learning operators.
The second enhanced operator is something more than just an operator, it re-
quires a slight change in the construction and implementation of the agents. For
the operator of preselection, agents will be equipped with a memory. And al-
though this memory is very limited, it will be shown to help improving agents’
learning performance. Precisely, agents will be given the ability to remember one
certain strategy together with the level of utility they gained from employing this
strategy. The speciﬁc strategy an agent remembers is her all time best strategy,
i.e. the strategy that has brought her the highest utility during the whole learning
process. During preselection an agent choses from two possible strategies: the
strategy she used in the last period (the ﬁtness of which she can remember) and
her all time best strategy. She decides by the ﬁtness. The strategy with the higher
ﬁtness is chosen as the strategy the following learning processes of the current
period (i.e. communication and experiment) are based on.
2In order to make sure the adherence to the non–negativity constraints (7), the pure mutation




3For a clear formulation of the points of criticism as well as for some suggestions how to ﬁll
the election operator with more economic meaning, see (Franke, 1997) and (Birchenhall et al.,
1997).






select population mt from mt
= 1
preselection on mt:



























Figure 2: main loop of preselection algorithm
8Note, that for non state dependent problems, like the ﬁxed price problem of
consumer choice, the preselection algorithm essentially works like an intra agent
operator of elitist selection for the basic strategy in each period. In the simple
















St is the population in Period t, S
H is the set of all different populations.
In problems of state dependent ﬁtness, on the contrary, all actions of all the
other agents in the population have an inﬂuence on an agent’s ﬁtness. This means,
that for mk
￿
￿ 0 in (7), the strategy an agent thinks of as her all time bestone, might
— due to the current population — not be as good as she thinks. A strategy that
once performed brilliantly may perform very poorly in the context of a different
population. This is a fact that the agents in this model are assumed to ignore.
Agents use the rule of preselection, because they simply do not know that they
may be mistaken.
3.4 Coping with the Constraints
The problem in focus is a problem of constrained optimization. Agents do not
onlyhaveto maximizeutilitybutalsohaveto be carefulnottoexceed theirbudget.
In the simulations, the budget constraint will not be directly accounted for. This
meansthatthereisno goodthe consumedquantityofwhich servesassomekindof
residual. This means that agents do not do something like determine the quantity





















Instead, agents freely decide on the quantity of all three goods, at ﬁrst hand inde-
pendently of the budget constraint. This also means, that in the ﬁxed price cases,
at the time of making their consumer plans, agents do not even know the prices of
the goods, which makes their decision problem even harder.
The complianceto the budget constraintissecuredby using apenalty function,
which is a standard tool in evolutionary optimization.5 Using a penalty function
means to decrease an agent’s ﬁtness if she breaks the budget constraint. In eco-
nomic terms, this looks like an extension to the utility function, which may be
rather unusual to most theoretical economists.
5See e.g. (Michalewicz, 1996, pp. 321).
9In the simulations the followingﬁtnessfunction wasused in orderto transform
utility ui







































Using ﬁtness function (17) means, that an agent can break the constraints, but
that she should learn not to do so.
4 Simulations and Results
For the model described above, simulations were run using three different al-
gorithms, a) the canonical algorithm, using selection/reproduction, crossover and
mutation, b) the election algorithm, using selection/reproduction and election, and
c)thepreselection algorithm,usingselection/reproduction, preselection,crossover
and mutation. The simulations were run for three different parameter sets which
only differ with respect to the elasticity of supply.
All three sets thus share the values for A









￿ 3, and a3
￿ 0
￿ 5. The








￿ 1. Thus, FIXPRICE represents the ﬁxed price case or, put





￿ 0001, thus representing a state





￿ 1 which leads to a state of low elasticity of supply.
Simulations were run for populations of n
￿ 500 agents and for tmax
￿ 500
periods.
6Negative ﬁtness values can arise, so that before entering the selection operator, ﬁtness has to
be subject to one of the standard positive transfer mechanisms. (Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1996)
7The deﬁnition of ‘elasticity of supply’ differs between various textbooks of microeconomic
theory. This paper makes use of the deﬁnition by Henderson and Quandt (1986), who deﬁne the
price elasticity of supply as the ratio of relative change in the quantity of supply (nominator) to the
relative change of the price (denominator).






This deﬁnition implies that the change in the quantity is a result of a change in market price. This
paper, though, will argue the other way round: A change in price is the reaction on a change in
aggregate demand, i.e. a change in quantity.
104.1 ﬁxed prices
For the ﬁxed price case, at least for the case of uniform behavior, optimal outcome
can be determined analytically. If all agents within a population behave the same,



















These result represent both, efﬁciency and optimality. This means that for the
results given in (18) the budget is fully spent (i.e. the budget residual is zero) and
every agent’s utility is as high as possible due to the budget.
The quality of the learning algorithms can be judged by comparing the learned
resultsto the theoretical resultsgiven by (18). More than this, it seems appropriate
to check if, and if so, how good, the budget constraint is met. In order to do this,
theaverage budget residualrt willbe used, which isdeﬁned asthe averageamount






















Representative simulation results for the three respective algorithms are given
in the following ﬁgures. Each ﬁgure consists of two subﬁgures which give a plot
of the population average of the quantities of good one to three (on the left) and a
plot of the average budget residual (on the right).
It is easy to see that for all three algorithms, the quantities tend to converge
toward the theoretically optimal quantities. The election algorithm seems to per-
form best whereas the canonical algorithm performs worst. This impression is
supported by the results concerning the budget residual. Election converges to
a residual equal to zero, preselection tends to oscillate around zero, whereas the
canonical algorithm results in relatively large positive residuals. This means that
each of the three learning methods is able no to violate the budget constraint, but
only learning with election and learning with preselection enables the agents not
to waste a part of their income.
4.2 ﬂexible prices, high elasticity
For the case of ﬂexible prices, it becomes impossible to determine an explicit
solution analytically even for the case of homogeneous behavior. In order to judge























































































































































































































































































istheaveragebudgetresidualasdeﬁnedinequation(19). The second one is the
difference between the marginal utility per dollar for each pair of the three goods.
Although it is impossible to solve the problem explicitly, the fact remains that in
an optimal solution of the consumer choice problem marginal utility per dollarhas
tobe equal foreachgood. Thus,aperfectsolutionshould havetwocharacteristics:
a) Marginal utility per dollar is the same for each of the three goods, and b) the
average budget residual is zero.
The plots of representativesimulations for the three algorithms and the HIGH-
ELASTICITY case (ﬁgures 6 to 8) consist of three subﬁgures each. The ﬁrst sub-
ﬁgure gives the population average of the quantities of each good. This subﬁgure
onlyserves asan illustration. The secondsubﬁguregivesthe average budgetresid-
ual rt. The third subﬁgure is a plot of the marginal utility per dollar for each of
the three goods.
A closer look at the ﬁgures conﬁrms the results of the FIXPRICE case. The
election algorithm performs best. Marginal utilities per Dollar seem to converge
completely while the budget residual vanishes. The preselection algorithm gen-
erates slightly worse results. While the budget residual ﬂuctuates around zero,
marginal utilities per Dollar become similar but not equal. The canonical algo-
rithm performs worst. Marginal utilities per Dollar become similar, but the budget


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































164.3 ﬂexible prices, low elasticity
The third case in focus, ﬂexible prices with a low elasticity of supply, causes quite
different results. It can be seen that the canonical algorithm does not reach a sen-
sible outcome. The budget constrained is never met while marginal utilities per
Dollar never get close to each other. In the LOWELASTICITY case, a sensi-






















































































































































(c) marginal utility per Dollar
Figure 9: Canonical Algorithm – Low Elasticity of Supply
Even worse is the result for the election algorithm. In each of the simulations
for this case, with only one explicitly shown in this paper, the model collapsed.
17Election leads to totally unrealistic cases of violation of the budget constraint
while marginal utilities per Dollar do not converge at all. For the case of ﬂexi-
ble prices and a low elasticity of supply, election is far from leading to any kind

























































































































































Figure 10: Election Algorithm – Low Elasticity of Supply
The only sensible results are achieved by the preselection algorithm, which
causes the marginal utilities per Dollar to become at least slightly similar to each























































































































































194.4 Summary of Results
At this early stage of the paper, the results are essentially based on two sources:
The plots of the simulations shown above and some statistics, which are up to
now only based on one run of each simulation only. The statistics can be found in
Appendix A.
Concerning the budget constraint it can be found, that it seems to be relatively
easy to learn not to violate it. For the FIXPRICE case as well as for HIGHELAS-
TICITY, the canonical algorithm results in states which are signiﬁcantly positive,
while election is signiﬁcantly very close to zero and preselection is even signiﬁ-
cantly equal to zero.
For the choice of the correct quantity or the best marginal utility per Dollar,
for FIXPRICE and HIGHELASTICITY, the results from the plots do not look too
bad, but from the statistics it can be found, that signiﬁcances are quite poor. From
the three different algorithms, the canonical one shows the highest degree of ﬂuc-
tuations (i.e. the highest variance) and consequently the highest (though still very
poor) signiﬁcance of reaching the optimal result, while election produces nearly
no ﬂuctuations at all, resulting in the least signiﬁcance of an optimal outcome.
For LOWELASTICITY, only the preselection algorithm leads to sensible re-
sults at all.
All in all, it seems as if the preselection algorithm performs best over all types
of economic situations. This means, that a little memory to the past notably im-
proves learning abilities.
5 Conclusions
5.1 The Inﬂuence of State Dependency
As a conclusion to be drawn from the simulation results it can be found that it
seems to be much harder to learn a sensible consumer choice in a situation with
low elasticity of supply than in situation with high (or even inﬁnitely high) elas-
ticity.
The reason for this is the following. In each turn of the algorithm (in each
market period) the resulting market prices and by that, the utility gained, reveal
some information to each agent. This information is information about the quality
of her last period consumption plan. Ceteris paribus, the plan was a good plan if
utility is high and so the plan should not be changed too much for the next period.
If, on the contrary, utility was not very high, the plan obviously was a bad one and
20thus should be changed. Unfortunately, this argument is only a ceteris–paribus
argument. The information revealed actually consists of two parts which cannot
be distinguished. Surely the information is information about the quality of the
agent’s plan. But it is only information about the quality of the agent’s plan in the
context of the plans of all other agents in the population. This means, that from
period to period the quality of an agent’s plan can be changed either by a change
in the plan itself or by a change in the plans of the rest of the population. While
there certainly is a direct impact of the agent on her economic success, there is
also an indirect impact caused by the rest of the population. This indirect impact
has often been called state dependency of agents’ ﬁtness.
State dependency can be found to cause noise in the part of the information
that valuable for the agent, i.e. the information about the quality of her plan. The
stronger the state dependency, the stronger is the noise, the less valuable is the
information to the agent, and thus the more complicated is the consumption de-
cision. Thus it should be shown that less elasticity of supply means more state
dependency in the problem of consumer choice in order to give a reason why less
elasticity seems to the complicate problem.
It can be shown that the gradient mk of the respective supply function (7) is a
measure ofstatedependency. Asketchofthe argumentrunsasfollows: Theutility
function8 (1) can be rewritten as integrating the budget constraint (2)9, using qi
￿m






































































From this, it can be recognized that a change in an agent’s utility can be caused
by two effects, by the direct effect of the agent changing her quantities, and by the
indirect effect of a change in prices.
8For notational convenience, the period index t is omitted.
9An important prerequisite for this is the constraint being an equation. As most of the sim-
ulations in fact do result in a situation where the budget is fully spent, for (2), equality is being
assumed.
21The interesting aspect is the change of the prices. From (7) it can be deduced




















It can thus be seen that a change in the price of a good is caused by a change
in the demand for this good of one or more of the agents.




























































































Focusing on the indirect effect, it is now easy to see that for each market k,
it is the parameter mk that decides the impact of the indirect effect on an agent’s
utility.
If, for example, mk
￿ 0, there is no indirect effect at all. Only the agent herself
has an inﬂuence on her utility. In other words: For mk
￿ 0, there is no state
dependency. Notice, that this case is the case of ﬁxed prices, which leads to
relatively good results for all three types of algorithms.
If, on the contrary, mk is very high, there is also a large inﬂuence of all other
agents on each agent’s utility. This is the case of high state dependency. This case
is equal to the case of ﬂexible prices and low elasticity of supply. In this case,
due to the high degree of state dependency, the noise in the information caused is
strong and consequently the learning results are relatively bad.
Summarizing, the higher m (i.e. the lower elasticity of supply), the higher is
the impact of state dependency on the change of each agent’s utility. This makes
it harder for an agent to recognize the impact of her own consumer plan on her
economic success which in turn makes it harder to learn a sensible solution to the
consumer choice problem.
225.2 The Inﬂuence of Different Learning Schemes
5.2.1 Election and the Concept of Potential Fitness
The algorithm using the election operator seems to perform very good in the FIX-
PRICE and in the HIGHELASTICITY cases, whereas in the LOWELASTICITY
case performance is extremely poor. In order to ﬁnd out the reasons for this be-
havior, it is appropriate to recall the central working principle of election. During
election, two agents meet and jointly try to ﬁnd a new strategy. They do this by,
among others, calculating a so called potential ﬁtness for the newly created strate-
gies, which should help to ﬁnd out which strategy is the best one. The calculation
of potential ﬁtness requires the knowledge about all the inﬂuences on future eco-
nomic success of the new strategies. As it is impossible to know about all these
inﬂuences, all these inﬂuences are assumed to be unchanged since the last period
of time.
This means, that the concept of potential ﬁtness is basically a concept of ‘ce-
teris paribus’ ﬁtness: An agent calculates the potential ﬁtness of her strategy as-
suming all the other agents will not change their behavior. This means that agent


















other words, most of the indirect inﬂuence on actual ﬁtness is neglected. This, of
cause, is absolutely correct for situations without state dependency, like the FIX-
PRICE case, and this is still quite good for low degrees of state dependency like
in the HIGHELASTICITY case. But, the more important the indirect effect, the
more severe becomes the difference between actual ﬁtness and potential ﬁtness.
In situations with high state dependency, e.g. in the LOWELASTICITY case, this
may lead to systematically wrong strategy choices, as can be seen from the simu-
lation results in ﬁgure 10.
5.2.2 Preselection
In contrast to election, preselection is not the end of the learning process in a
period, but the beginning. Whereas in the process of election, the strategy result-
ing from the election process is the one to be applied in the market, the strategy
resulting from preselection is subject to learning by communication (crossover)
and experiment (mutation), before it is used at the market. This means that in
situations with only little state dependency, preselection – like election – has the
advantage of chosing between two strategies (the all time best and last strategy
used last period), but the ‘pure’ result of the preselection process can be slightly
changed during the following two learning steps, which may be a disadvantage.
23But, these following two learning steps become the great advantage of preselec-
tion in situations with high degrees of statedependency. This means, that different
from election learning, preselection learning does not get stuck in strategies that
are successful only due to potential but not to actual ﬁtness, but can still change
the preselected strategy in each period.
6 Summary
The paper employs three different learning algorithms in order to ﬁnd out, if
boundedly rational agents can learn to choose the optimal consumption bundle.
In the model, the problem is complicated by allowing for ﬂexible prices and al-
lowing for violation of the budget constraint.
It can be found that it is relatively easy to learn not to break the budget con-
straint, but that it seem to be quite complicated to ﬁnd the optimal consumption
bundle. Simulation results show that the problem becomes even worse if the elas-
ticity of supply decreases. It is shown that a decrease in the elasticity of supply
means an increase in the degree of state dependency. For some types of algo-
rithm, state dependency works like an external effect: Agents do not include it
into their calculations for their future strategy, thus being badly mistaken in each
future period of time.
Can boundedly rational agents learn the optimal consumer choice? — They
can, if the problem is not too complicated. And they do even better if they have
some memory of the past.
This is all of the message this paper can give, but at least this seems to be a
better story to tell the ﬁrst year students if they ask again ...
A Data
The following tables show data from one randomly chosen simulation each. All
simulations were run for 1000 periods with a population size of n=500. The
data contains information about rounds 501 to 1000 to eliminate possible startup
effects of the algorithms.
24FIXPRICE




￿ 50 and r
￿ 0, respectively.
Canonical Election Preselection
q1 Mean 20.2484 20.0492 20.2077
Var. 0.515554 0.000617538 0.0153379
t 7.73661 44.2923 37.4965
q2 Mean 30.8866 30.0306 29.9948
Var. 1.36406 0.00149178 0.00520296
t -186.699 -5760.89 -3035.61
q3 Mean 47.4426 49.9195 49.7968
Var. 1.33563 0.00358468 0.00447201
t -575.641 -11185.8 -9961.81
r Mean 1.4224 0.000674724 0.000770113
Var. 0.453434 3.88333 E(-7) 0.000613616
t 47.2334 24.2108 0.69517
HIGHELASTICITY
The t–value is a test statistic of an approximate Gauss test for r
￿ 0, the values













￿ $ Mean 0.178931 0.185862 0.189568
Var. 0.0000532438 8.59688 E(-7) 7.43989 E(-6)
MU2
￿ $ Mean 0.178914 0.183026 0.181765
Var. 0.0000914054 2.21833 E(-7) 3.54032 E(-6)
MU3
￿ $ Mean 0.196372 0.184637 0.183881
Var. 0.0000684217 2.27176 E(-7) 6.94431 E(-7)
t12 0.0316065 60.9781 52.6552
t13 -35.3568 26.2744 44.5869
t23 -30.8784 -53.7592 -22.9925
r Mean 4.1415 0.0108742 -0.0000875281
Var. 0.63692 0.0000392457 0.00494539
t 116.038 38.8137 -0.0278312




￿ $ Mean 0.00531371 0.000225087 0.00901293
Var. 3.19915 E(-7) 0 2.0274 E(-7)
MU2
￿ $ Mean 0.00768015 0.00624466 0.00837344
Var. 6.2859 E(-7) 0 9.85724 E(-8)
MU3
￿ $ Mean 0.0131581 0.00156332 0.0080648




r Mean 13.3108 -5453.53 -0.538288
Var. 26.2627 0 4.07375
t 58.0792 -5.96352
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